syzygy wrote:You did not answer my question whether you consider that your detailed description in natural language of the Fruit evaluation features is protected by the copyright on Fruit.
To the extent that the description determines the evaluation features [and that there are no filtration issues], I would say yes. As an analogy, let's say that I have a logo [as an artistic work, not as a trademark]. A natural language description might be rather inspecific, such as: it is generally wedge-shaped, with three pointy triangles coming out the top, and a saucer-like disk in the lower-right -- there's also about 10 small dots/stars in a wave-like pattern running from lower-middle to middle-right. Or it could be rather pedantic: there is a 240 degree wedge of radius 5cm oriented south, with three protruding isosceles triangles of sizes [...]. The latter might still not be quite so completely expressed as something like Postscript code, but tends more to expression than the former. Similarly, if the evaluation features were sufficiently generic ("Rooks on 7th"), there would be no argument, but the comparison made was at a much finer level. [And as I say, all the above ignores filtration issues for now]. Suppose, then, you take the detailed logo description such as above, and from this reexpress it on a T-shirt, while also making it 125% as large, rotated by 30 degrees, and green/white instead of red/blue. Depending on how perfectly the detailed description was followed, you could still have (say) something that an outside observer would perceive as sufficiently similar (the questions of whether size, orientation, and colour scheme play a part of the artistic content would obviously also be relevant). If you want to go back to computer programs, cleanroom descriptions should not be overly specified to the extent that they produce a substantially similar work (in this regard, one reason why the cleanup of OSCAR was deemed legitimate is that functionality dictated much of the similarities).
syzygy wrote:BB+ wrote:I find the Rybka re-expression of the Fruit expressions typically to fall rather close to translation in this sense. I'm also not sure what role the concrete board representation has? I would say it's like choosing what font to use when printing a file -- there is already suitable expression in the text itself.
Ok, you are not reasonable either. Further discussion does not seem useful.
I think I am essentially following the abstractions test for literary works. If I write a novel, the underlying story (one abstraction level up) is also subject to copyright. In some cases (depending how generic the story is, for instance), you would not be free to realise the same story as a motion picture, without infringing copyright. Similarly, using something akin to translation, and then claiming this is re-expressing the "idea" behind source code seems to me to be misapplying the word "idea".
syzygy wrote:BB+ wrote:Again I find this rather categorical. Many computer programs (such as video games) have aspects beyond the mere "functional" [quotation truncated here -- it continued] though I admit the most copyrightable aspects therein are often shunted out to audiovisual and/or user-experience considerations.
I'll just note that you took the video game example from me.
I was actually recalling my
own post (at the very bottom), though this itself was merely quoting Altai concerning Stern/Kaufman:
See Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 [213 USPQ 443] (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that an audiovisual works copyright, rather than a copyright on the underlying program, extended greater protection to the sights and sounds generated by a computer video game because the same audiovisual display could be generated by different programs). Your truncation of my quotation in particular scrubbed the word "audiovisual" which appears in the above citation (but not in your post).
EDIT: Hmm, it seems that I might also have been remembering an earlier part of that same post, where I quoted
Midway/Bandai, again on audiovisual considerations. In fact, reading this again, the court opinion addresses the "overly specified idea" question, so I will quote it here:
Midway v. Bandai wrote:Audiovisual works such as these are primarily unprotectable games. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617. As the Seventh Circuit noted, however, the particular forms in which they are expressed — "shapes, sizes, colors, sequences, arrangements, and sounds" — add something beyond the mere game idea. Id. Thus, "The audio component and the concrete details of the visual presentation constitute the copyrightable expression of that game `idea'". Id. Nonetheless, Bandai argues that any similarities between its games and Midway's are nonactionable since they result from an allegedly inevitable connection between the expressions and the similarities in the underlying unprotectable ideas.
Bandai's position fails as a matter of law. It assumes, sub silentio, that the idea of Midway's Galaxian game actually includes the physical characteristics of the characters involved. If such reasoning were accepted, a copyright defendant could always avoid liability merely by describing a plaintiff's work in great detail and then labeling that description the "idea" of plaintiff's work. The "idea" of any work could always be defined in such detail that the description of the expression would add nothing to the "idea", thus allowing a defendant to engage in all but verbatim copying. Such a ploy cannot be allowed. As the Krofft court noted, the description of the work for the purpose of identifying its idea must be a simple one. [...]
