FIDE Rules on ICGA - Rybka controversy

[Chris Whittington]

A (verdict) had been sexed up and then used to justify B (extended sanctions). Levy was already out of control at verdict stage, the smell of blood and the shark-like feeding frenzy on awards, titles, prizes, bans etc etc had already begun at A.

"plagiarism most serious etc etc"". Really? Not an objectively true statement.

"If violation of principles of legality and lack of suficient guarantees for a fair trial" should normally lead to unconditional voiding of any sanction; do they not also normally lead to unconditional voiding of the verdict? Am I missing something here?

I think the bare-bones situation would be:

• Association X informs member M that action A is being considered him
• Member M decides that action A is insufficient to motivate him to mount a defence
• Assocation X takes actions A and B against member M
• Action B is later determined to be without cause
• Member M then argues that if he had known B was at stake, a defense would have been provided, ergo A is invalid

Given that Action B was never known to M in the first place, and its application was overturned in the end, I don't see how it relates to A, which I would think should be considered on its own merits and procedural background, independent of B.

Or to make this a more real-world example:

• The IRS informs you that it plans to levy a tax lien on your property (ie, seize it)
• You decide it is not worth the effort in fighting this
• The IRS ends up both levying the lien and freezing your back account (though not [yet] seizing the funds)
• After multiple years of onerous legal efforts, the latter is found to be unjustified (for multiple reasons)
• You then argue that the tax lien levy is thereby procedurally invalid

[BB+]

... The TD must be given a lot of leeway, or he won't be able to guarantee a smooth running tournament. In my opinion that also means that the TD should not be able to impose sanctions more severe than disqualification from the tournament.

Given that the tournament director is (exactly as the name says!) for that tournament, I'm not sure how a larger penalty could be applied?! Also, the rules of competition might be more applicable than association law. For instance, (20.3) of the Competition Rules of the Dutch League allow the "competition manager" (competitieleider, which is more an organiser than a TD it seems) to apply a ban of up to 3 years for rules violations (though it is subject to appeal). Presumably an annual open event (like the World Open) could similarly attach multi-year contigencies to its entry rules, and apply them at least at the organisational level.

The "no need for a fair trial" part referred mainly to the case where a TD rules in the course of a tournament. ... It is strange that at the same time the EC requires the "sanction procedure" to guarantee the right to be heard. Obviously that applies to sanctions imposed post-tournament and not to sanctions imposed by the TD during a tournament. It is difficult to understand why the post-tournament application of "tournament rule 2" (including the imposition of its sanction) does, in the EC's view, not require the right to be heard (and other obvious principles of fairness) to be guaranteed.

From my reading of the EC decision, the "sanction" of disqualification (by TD or ICGA executive) does not fall under association law, whereas the sanction of lifetime ban does. So the right-to-be-heard is specifically applicable to the latter case, but not (necessarily) the former. Maybe using the word "sanction" for both is confusing and/or misleading, and "penalty" could be used (merely semantically if nothing else) for the former so as to try to avoid this?

Furthermore, it is arguable that the ICGA's actions did in fact suffice for any right-to-be-heard of Rajlich's regarding disqualification (of course, it is conversely arguable that other procedural aspects did not meet a "minimum degree of fairness"), and perhaps the EC considered this. So it may be too broad of a reading of the EC decision to conclude that they would allow "anything" to occur ex post facto, just as long as it could be shoe-horned under a heading of tournament rules.

ICGA rule 2 was supposed to be enforced by the TD ... What happened here is that the ICGA decided, many many many years after a tournament was held, that rule 2 could still be used, not by the TD but by the ICGA Executive Committee, to change the outcome of the tournament ... Or at least, this is how the EC put things. The EC obviously found it curious that the outcome of the tournament was not final even though there was no clear legal basis for the ICGA Executive Committee to revise it. But the EC let the ICGA escape: "It's a possible interpretation of their rules."

Anyway, since in 2011 the tournament was not running anymore and it was not the TD that had to take the decision, there was no justification for not ensuring a minimum degree of fairness. In so far as the EC's judgment suggests that the ICGA Executive Committee could, today, strip let's say the 1983 winner of its title without even giving that person the right to be heard, I cannot help but feel troubled by it

I too would be leery of that in principle, but as in my previous comment I think this is a bit broad of a reading. Moreover, historical sportive decisions have been taken in a such manner. For instance, the decision of the BCS (in 2011) to strip USC of its 2004 championship probably would not meet everyone's view of propriety: The move was all but preordained four years ago when — as USC's infractions case was unfolding — the BCS enacted a policy that called for teams' BCS appearances and titles to be vacated when major rules violations subsequently were discovered and the institutions were sanctioned by the NCAA. I take it that this "policy" (enacted in 2007) had the end consequence of declaring the USC was ab ovo ineligible in 2004, and thus its appearance in the event was vacated. [There was a right-to-be-heard by USC toward the NCAA and its sanctions, but not toward the BCS if I understand correctly]. On the other hand, doping agencies like USADA usually do consider "removal of competitive results" as properly part of sanctions (which can then applied by various sportive associations through shared competency).

In general, disqualification over organisational matters (such as eligibility of players) is treated differently than disqualification for other reasons (doodling, failing to shake hands, etc. -- for instance, an appeals committee is likely competent in the latter cases but not in the former), particularly in the aspect of retroactive applicability. Presumably the ICGA can argue that Rybka was "ineligible" due to failing to bethe original work of the entering developers, with this information only coming to light many years later. Obviously Rule 2 is best applied on-the-spot, but at the same time, as I think HGM said awhile back, the event should not degenerate into a contest of seeing who can best avoid being caught within a given timeframe.

I'm not so sure that rule 2 was actually viewed by the ICGA as the legal basis.

Perhaps it is not the legal basis (I consider this below), but I think Rule 2 is clearly the substantive basis. The ICGA decision says: Vasik Rajlich has violated the ICGA’s tournament rules ... Specifically, Vasik Rajlich, on all five occasions, violated Tournament Rule 2 .... Similar verbiage appears on Page 1 of the Investigative Report: If versions of Rybka are derived from Fruit and participated in ICGA tournaments, then Rybka has also violated ICGA Tournament Rules; and then again in the Recommendations: This is in violation of the ICGA Tournament Rules. For that matter: All panel members who expressed an opinion agree that Vasik Rajlich’s Rybka violated the ICGA Tournament Rules.

The ICGA decision continues from rules violations to sanctions: The ICGA regards Vasik Rajlich’s violation of the above mentioned rule as the most serious offence ... The ICGA is of the view that such a serious offence deserves to be met with correspondingly serious sanctions against the perpetrator. In deciding on appropriate sanctions the ICGA has borne in mind the approach of the International Olympic Committee for dealing with the most serious cases of the violations of its rules.

I definitely can consider that the EC chose its bifurcation between tournament rules and sanctions so as to disturb the situation as little as possible, and moreover that as a "legal basis" the ICGA might be relying on the Panel Charter when it could/should more directly indicate Rule 2. However, it does seem that a rules violation (determined "after seeking expert advice") was the substantive basis for the decision. Levy's attempt to give the ICGA Board the authority to sanction via the Panel Charter is invalid, but I don't think that the Panel/Charter as a basis for advising the ICGA executive can be disputed. The Charter does mention disqualification as a terminal action of the Board, but "it's a possible interpretation" that this can be considered to be a superfluous enaction by non-jurists, and that the Board already had such authority (as a legal basis) in the first place, particularly when it received new pieces of evidence after the conclusion of the championships.

Or in other words, just because the ICGA might purport that the Charter is the legal basis of the "whole investigation including the sanctioning", this doesn't mean that there isn't some other alternative (and more proper) legal basis [conveniently sketched out by the EC].

So on the point of the non-independent panel investigation (leading to a report that included nothing less than a guilty verdict ("Not a single panel member believed him innocent")) the ICGA escaped again thanks to the EC's willingness to consider it part of the application of a "tournament rule".

The EC was of the opinion that it was not of crucial significance whether the Panel was independent, as only the ICGA Board was responsible. Thus they did not need to consider whether it factually was or wasn't "independent" and/or to what extent (can a subsidiary advisory body ever be properly independent?!). But I'm not sure what your point is here -- would the use of a "non-independent" panel somehow annul any (otherwise proper) sanctions assessed by the ICGA board? I don't think it matters whether "tournament rules" or "sanctions" are being considered in the context of the "independence" of the panel.

There are quite a few other issues that could have been raised.

Perhaps Rajlich should have raised them then (rather than fill his complaint with assorted odds-and-ends)!

For example, how could the ICGA Executive Committee ever come to the decision to disqualify Rajlich from tournaments in which he did not enter any of the Rybka versions that were investigated...

I think the conspiracy theory is that the ICGA gave too much credence to Mark Uniacke's comment in the Panel report. The Recommendations do say: suitable punishment is to strip Rajlich of all ICGA Tournament Titles. So maybe one can argue that the ICGA asked Rajlich to "show cause" concerning all his entries, and his refusal to do so was then seen as evidence of non-originality (note that any investigation was encumbered, for it was not clear whether Rybka 3 or 4 could be taken as surrogates for 2008-10 entries, in contrast to 2.3.2a for 2007 and 1.2f or 2.0 for 2006).

[Chris Whittington]

So, a violation of the principle of legality plus a lack of sufficient guarantees for a fair "trial".

I would say that is the conclusion, but only for the "sanctions" part, not for the other ICGA proceedings. Quoting the EC motivation:

In the opinion of the EC, ICGA’s proceedings and decisions against Mr Rajlich had a double nature:
from one side they concerned the evaluation of an assumed violation of ICGA’s tournament rules, from
another side they were extended to punish a behaviour that was considered also as a violation of ICGA’s
not written disciplinary-ethical rules ...  For any decision concerning a violation of their tournament rules,
ICGA has not to respect a given model of procedural rules, even less the principles of a “fair trial”, just
because this is not a trial. Exactly as a chief arbiter or a tournament director may impose penalties or
disqualify a player from a competition without respecting a given model of procedural rules ...

contrasted with

Members of the ICGA’s Executive Committee ignored they had to respect specific rules if they intended
to carry out disciplinary proceedings against Mr Rajlich.

So the ICGA will likely decide to leave things as they are? Why would that be OK? ... So there is no justification [for the lifetime ban]? So you expect that the ICGA will simply not care about the EC's opinion?

I have heard that Levy is drafting a statement for the next ICGA Journal issue. To the best of my knowledge, the ICGA received the decision in early April, which was a bit short of the 3-month deadline for proposals to modify their statutes at the Triennial Meeting this year. So most likely nothing can be done in this regard until 2018.

If I understand correctly your inquiry about the "justification", my response would be: there is no statutory basis in the ICGA Constitution for sanctions and thus no justification of the lifetime ban. I would definitely agree that w/o the right to sanction, any sanction (including a "lifetime ban") is void as a matter of law. At the same time, I personally don't see any reason for the ICGA to address the issue until Rajlich tries to enter their tournaments again, otherwise it is just a philosophical point. Now there are two elements that oversee the ICGA's actions regarding their sanctions of Rajlich: national law and the FIDE CoE.

For the former, Rajlich can lodge a complaint in front of the competent ordinary judge, asking the lifetime ban to be overturned. I don't see him doing this w/o a desire to actually compete, but you never know. In that case, I could expect that the decision would be in his favour. Even then, the decision itself would be operative: the national court would not order the ICGA to rescind the ban, it would simply void it ab ovo -- in particular, there would be no ICGA press release saying "ICGA rescinds lifetime ban of Rajlich" [similarly, FIDE has seen no reason to remove from their (online) Handbook some Statutes that were annulled 2 years ago by the CAS, even though said Handbook was recently changed to include the CoE modifications -- nonetheless, the Statutes should be considered null].

As for revisiting the lifetime ban so as to appease the FIDE EC, as I mentioned previously, I would expect the ICGA to fall back to the statement from the Panel report ("until he can satisfy the ICGA that [his programs] are no longer derivatives"), which is arguably not a "sanction" so much as a condition for entry [though indeed the "originality" condition must be applied to all competitors, at the same time some discriminantion based upon prior incidents should be acceptable]. But again, I don't think the ICGA needs to make a public declaration if they choose that path, and most likely Levy would prefer to send some sort of report to the EC regarding whatever the ICGA Executive decides.

I reiterate that I personally am rather surprised that, given the EC discussion of prior conditions for applying sanctions, they opined that FIDE rules could be applied, which would allow a ban of (up to) 3 years, even though such a sanction by the ICGA would not meet "national mandatory rules" to my understanding. Perhaps the EC is willing, as per the comments in the EC Tromso Report, to consider any failure in this regard to be relatively minor until member federations and affiliated organisations receive assistance to reinforce their internal structures so as to allow sanctions, and minimal procedural rules for the evaluation of breaches of ethics can be added as mandatory for all FIDE members, as a part of FIDE Handbook.

When did you dismiss the hypothesis that the ICGA might simply do the right thing and nullify the process or part of the process where they overstepped the limits?

[syzygy]

... The TD must be given a lot of leeway, or he won't be able to guarantee a smooth running tournament. In my opinion that also means that the TD should not be able to impose sanctions more severe than disqualification from the tournament.

Given that the tournament director is (exactly as the name says!) for that tournament, I'm not sure how a larger penalty could be applied?!

It would not be difficult to imagine that the tournament rules specified that the TD could ban a player from any tournament for a particular period of time. But that would be wrong, because there would be insufficient guarantees for the player and such a sanction is simply not necessary for the purpose of letting the game or tournament come to a good end.

So in football, the referee can send a player off by showing him a red card, but he cannot at the same time decide the number of games for which the player is suspended. That will be decided afterwards in a procedure that offers certain guarantees to the player.

In case a serious foul goes unnoticed by the referee in a football match, the football association can rule on it after the game. In that case there is no need anymore for an immediate decision and therefore no need for denying a player procedural guarantees, so the association will in fact decide on guilt and on a sanction only after a "fair" procedure.

There might be some CAS case law on this, but I haven't looked for it yet.

Also, the rules of competition might be more applicable than association law. For instance, (20.3) of the Competition Rules of the Dutch League allow the "competition manager" (competitieleider, which is more an organiser than a TD it seems) to apply a ban of up to 3 years for rules violations (though it is subject to appeal). Presumably an annual open event (like the World Open) could similarly attach multi-year contigencies to its entry rules, and apply them at least at the organisational level.

Agreed, but such post-tournament procedures will have to guarantee procedural fairness.

From my reading of the EC decision, the "sanction" of disqualification (by TD or ICGA executive) does not fall under association law, whereas the sanction of lifetime ban does. So the right-to-be-heard is specifically applicable to the latter case, but not (necessarily) the former.

This is also how I read it (but not because of the type of sanction, but of the legal basis for the sanction), but in my view the distinction is artificial and unjustified in so far as the sanctions are imposed post-tournament. And I don't for a moment believe that it was ever the official position of the ICGA Executive Committee that it could retroactively disqualify say the 1983 winner without even giving that person the right to be heard on the basis of "tournament rule 2".

Furthermore, it is arguable that the ICGA's actions did in fact suffice for any right-to-be-heard of Rajlich's regarding disqualification (of course, it is conversely arguable that other procedural aspects did not meet a "minimum degree of fairness"), and perhaps the EC considered this.

That is arguable, but I don't think it is possible to read the judgment like that. "For any decision concerning a violation of their tournament rules, ICGA has not to respect a given model of procedural rules (...)." "Exactly as a chief arbiter or a TD (...)." "an Investigation panel (that has not to be necessarily independent)."

I'll admit that the judgment does not state that Rajlich was not given the right to be heard as regards the alleged rule 2 violation, but that is because it is silent on that point. There was no need to answer that point, since it was a "tournament rule". (Had the EC seen this differently, it would have had to investigate whether the panel was impartial, etc.)

So it may be too broad of a reading of the EC decision to conclude that they would allow "anything" to occur ex post facto, just as long as it could be shoe-horned under a heading of tournament rules.

What the EC will do in an extreme case is difficult to predict, but if this judgment is anything to go by, they will accept it. The only test seems to be whether the procedure followed can somehow be brought under a broad interpretation of rule 2 and whether the ICGA Executive Committee itself acts impartially.

For instance, the decision of the BCS (in 2011) to strip USC of its 2004 championship probably would not meet everyone's view of propriety: The move was all but preordained four years ago when — as USC's infractions case was unfolding — the BCS enacted a policy that called for teams' BCS appearances and titles to be vacated when major rules violations subsequently were discovered and the institutions were sanctioned by the NCAA.

As long as the new "policy" enacted only implied that the rules and sanctions that already existed were now also going to be enforced, then this is not necessarily unacceptable. The rules that were violated already seem to have existed. I suppose the sanctions existed as well, though that is less clear. Assuming those sanctions were already in place as well, one could still argue that a drastic change in policy amounts to a breach of the principle of legitimate expectations, but how legitimate is the expectation not to be punished for major violations of the rules... Anyway, I certainly do not know the details of that case.

Presumably the ICGA can argue that Rybka was "ineligible" due to failing to bethe original work of the entering developers, with this information only coming to light many years later. Obviously Rule 2 is best applied on-the-spot, but at the same time, as I think HGM said awhile back, the event should not degenerate into a contest of seeing who can best avoid being caught within a given timeframe.

Rule 2 is of course quite problematic to apply properly. How is the TD going to find "expert advice" a few minutes before a game is supposed to start? But the ICGA drafted the rule and the rule, at least according to its wording, does not provide for post-tournament application. The ICGA could have responded to requests for investigation of Rybka by saying that the rules do not allow revision of past tournament results, but that the ICGA was open to proposals for amendment of the tournament rules.

I'm not so sure that rule 2 was actually viewed by the ICGA as the legal basis.

Perhaps it is not the legal basis (I consider this below), but I think Rule 2 is clearly the substantive basis.

I agree it was used as the substantive basis. But the procedure and sanctions were laid down in the Charter.

Of course, assuming tournament rule 2 indeed should be interpreted as giving the ICGA Executive Committee the power to disqualify entrants post-tournament after seeking expert advice, then it was probably legitimate to lay down, in 2011, more detailed procedural rules in the Charter. But, as the EC ruled, the sanctions should have been laid down earlier.

However, it does seem that a rules violation (determined "after seeking expert advice") was the substantive basis for the decision. Levy's attempt to give the ICGA Board the authority to sanction via the Panel Charter is invalid, but I don't think that the Panel/Charter as a basis for advising the ICGA executive can be disputed. The Charter does mention disqualification as a terminal action of the Board, but "it's a possible interpretation" that this can be considered to be a superfluous enaction by non-jurists, and that the Board already had such authority (as a legal basis) in the first place, particularly when it received new pieces of evidence after the conclusion of the championships.

I agree. (I think the EC did stretch the wording of rule 2, though.)

So on the point of the non-independent panel investigation (leading to a report that included nothing less than a guilty verdict ("Not a single panel member believed him innocent")) the ICGA escaped again thanks to the EC's willingness to consider it part of the application of a "tournament rule".

The EC was of the opinion that it was not of crucial significance whether the Panel was independent, as only the ICGA Board was responsible.

In my reading not because the ICGA Board was responsible, but because the "seeking of expert advice" is part of a "tournament rule".

Thus they did not need to consider whether it factually was or wasn't "independent" and/or to what extent (can a subsidiary advisory body ever be properly independent?!).

The ICGA Board had to decide on the basis of the panel's report. Note that the content of the report is not readily verifiable and the ICGA Board in any case lacked the expertise to verify the technical facts asserted.

Vas could not appoint a counter-panel to produce a counter-report, let alone one on the same footing as the "official" panel report, so the panel should have been independent to preserve equality of arms.

Advisory bodies in quasi-judicial procedures are usually required to be independent. Same for expert witnesses.

But I'm not sure what your point is here -- would the use of a "non-independent" panel somehow annul any (otherwise proper) sanctions assessed by the ICGA board? I don't think it matters whether "tournament rules" or "sanctions" are being considered in the context of the "independence" of the panel.

For the EC it seems to matter whether it is about "tournament rules" or about "non-tournament rules". In my view the relevant distinction is "must be resolved during the tournament" versus "post-tournament". Anyway, yes, lack of independence of the panel taints the evidence (= panel report) that formed the basis for the ICGA Executive Committee's decision.

Of course the panel could not help that the ICGA Executive Board even went beyond the facts established by the panel. The panel did not establish any facts regarding Rybka 3, for example. (The report did contain subjective views on Rybka 3 and I'm afraid even an analysis of Rajlich's character, but those views should have been left out and should have been ignored by the ICGA Executive Board. Expert advice should not take the form of "I have reasons not to trust that guy, so he is guilty".)

There are quite a few other issues that could have been raised.

Perhaps Rajlich should have raised them then (rather than fill his complaint with assorted odds-and-ends)!

He was not given a real chance. He was invited to a panel in lynch mode, so he rightfully refused. That refusal was then used against him, which in my view is completely unjustified. In the end he was given one month to reply during a time in which he was very busy. After so many years, would it have been too much to delay by a few more months?

For example, how could the ICGA Executive Committee ever come to the decision to disqualify Rajlich from tournaments in which he did not enter any of the Rybka versions that were investigated...

I think the conspiracy theory is that the ICGA gave too much credence to Mark Uniacke's comment in the Panel report. The Recommendations do say: suitable punishment is to strip Rajlich of all ICGA Tournament Titles. So maybe one can argue that the ICGA asked Rajlich to "show cause" concerning all his entries, and his refusal to do so was then seen as evidence of non-originality (note that any investigation was encumbered, for it was not clear whether Rybka 3 or 4 could be taken as surrogates for 2008-10 entries, in contrast to 2.3.2a for 2007 and 1.2f or 2.0 for 2006).

The panel recommendation should not have included any suggestion on the sanction or penalty to be imposed, at least not if the panel is supposed to exist for the purpose of giving expert advice on technical issues. I accept there is also an element of "programmer's ethics", so I guess it is OK to give a view on the severity of the rule infraction, but such views should not suggest any sanctions. (And of course Rule 2 is pretty clear anyway on what the possible sanction could be.)

When was Rajlich asked to prove his innocence for all his entries? When did he refuse to do so? And how could he have done it, except by opening up his code to his worst enemies?

(Why does the "recommendation" make a point of the entry forms not mentioning that earlier versions, that everybody agrees never competed in ICGA tournaments and had little if anything in common with the "real" Rybka, included code from Crafty? A program that was in fact recommended by Hyatt to use as a starting point that one could eventually evolve into something that is "yours".)

[BB+]

Furthermore, it is arguable that the ICGA's actions did in fact suffice for any right-to-be-heard of Rajlich's regarding disqualification, and perhaps the EC considered this.

That is arguable, but I don't think it is possible to read the judgment like that ... I'll admit that the judgment does not state that Rajlich was not given the right to be heard as regards the alleged rule 2 violation, but that is because it is silent on that point.

The following phrase could be taken to indicate that the EC felt that Rajlich was sufficiently informed of the possibility of disqualification: One person who is informed that his behaviour could be qualified as a cheating and sanctioned with a lifetime ban is likely to assume different decisions about his defence, in comparison to a person who just know about the risk to be disqualified from a tournament. I wouldn't think they would just be making an abstract comparison, but they indeed might (a few lines previous it talks of the "very informal way" that Rajlich was informed for instance). I'm not sure what other elements of a right to be heard are at issue? Unless you are putting impartiality under this heading?

"For any decision concerning a violation of their tournament rules, ICGA has not to respect a given model of procedural rules (...)." "Exactly as a chief arbiter or a TD (...)." "an Investigation panel (that has not to be necessarily independent)."

Contrariwise, while the EC stresses that the ICGA didn't have to follow any particular procedure, at the same time I don't think it passes any specific judgement on the procedure the ICGA chose, in particular whether it sufficed for a right to be heard and/or for (subsidiary) impartiality. Perhaps they are taking the easy way out (again), and ruling on essentially a formal matter rather than a substantive one.

What the EC will do in an extreme case is difficult to predict, but if this judgment is anything to go by, they will accept it.

It could be my personal bias, but I think the presentations in this case tended to diminish Rajlich's prospects (already the complaint is rather fitful, without even seeing Levy's response). Even when there is viable content, it does not particularly impress. For instance on page 4, given as "in his own words" we read: It was clear that the ICGA had no intention of handling things in a fair manner. They made loud and unnecessary public accusations. They put vocal Rybka critics in charge. They did not investigate any other engines. And so on. However, none of these statements (particularly the last!) are expanded much except for the third (which by implication relates to the first, but does not make it "clear" IMO). There is no citation of such "loud and unnecessary public accusations (by the ICGA)", and similarly no reason is given why the ICGA should investigate any other engines (without a formal complaint). The makeup of the Panel (particularly the Secretariat) is discussed at length, but the EC seems to have agreed that as it was properly advisory, and that as Rajlich was allowed to respond to its conclusions and recommendations, this sufficed for "impartiality" to be met.

Note that 3 of the 5 EC members were jurists/lawyers, while the other two were not AFAIK (such a mix might well be wise in this type of body), and the latter would be more likely to state their opinions by impressions and let the others sort out the technical details. What is one to think of the overwrought grandiloquence of 4.3?: "This act of shocking lawlessness" and Apparently the ICGA believes that it is the supreme ruling body of computer chess, and that its actions and decrees are the final word on all matters related to computer chess. We do not recognize the ICGA as such a body and wonder from where such outlandish pretensions derive their legitimacy. It is hard to see how this would make a good impression. Similarly in the 2013 emendation regarding the purported "right to an appeal", Schröder's cited correspondence (as Rajlich's carte blanche representative) tends to the vexatious by the end.

The ICGA Board had to decide on the basis of the panel's report.

It might be said that this was particularly true when Rajlich chose not to offer an alternative defense ... But I would also say that the Board could have taken a different tack, decided that the Panel had gotten out of hand, etc. Unlikely for sure, but they did not "have" to decide based on the report, particularly in any formal sense (as a judge would have to rule on evidence). Also, Levy makes the point in the ChessBase interview that the Board decision was based on both the Panel report and on the evidence that underlied it (re-reading this, I also find that he cites Article III Section 1 as a basis of sanctions: the Executive Committee of the ICGA is charged with the administrative affairs of the association).

Note that the content of the report is not readily verifiable and the ICGA Board in any case lacked the expertise to verify the technical facts asserted.

How is it not verifiable? The members of the Board had full access to the investigation wiki, from which the report contents came. And regarding the second statement, I don't think it is particularly true, unless you mean that the Board is formally supposed to pretend that it lacks any technical capacity, and only go on the arguments given?

Vas could not appoint a counter-panel to produce a counter-report, let alone one on the same footing as the "official" panel report, so the panel should have been independent to preserve equality of arms. Advisory bodies in quasi-judicial procedures are usually required to be independent. ... Anyway, yes, lack of independence of the panel taints the evidence (= panel report) that formed the basis for the ICGA Executive Committee's decision.

So would the only way for the ICGA to meet any requirement herein be to find a pre-existent outside body to which both sides were agreeable? This would seem quite a high bar of expectation (particularly if the ICGA had to foot any costs), and so perhaps "this is not a trial" is a better model, allowing Rajlich a right to respond to any report (and/or take part in the investigation that would produce the report). My memory is quite clear that Rajlich (after the verdict, in the context of having someone independently review it) specifically said something along the lines of "Appointing someone 'independent' doesn't mean much when you get to choose who it is."

At any rate, I would agree that Levy's initial plan with the Panel, that both sides would join it and come to a meeting-of-minds (regarding technical matters), greatly backfired in the end, and that after Rajlich decided not to join therein, it would have been better to re-position it as something closer to prosecutorial rather than merely "investigative". But again, once Rajlich is negative toward the panel idea (in general), what exactly could the ICGA do so as to ensure independence and/or equality of arms? Maybe "decertify" the investigation panel from being "official" and let Letouzey (say, or his designate) form such a group on his own, which would then "have standing" to present the evidence to the Board? [At that point, it would be hard to construe it as being merely "expert advice" anymore (cf. Rule #2 and EC procedural interpretation therein), rather it would be notably advocatory].

Advisory bodies in quasi-judicial procedures are usually required to be independent. Same for expert witnesses.

Taken to the absurd, could you then argue that the "seeking expert advice" in Rule #2 should thus mean an independent expert [to the extent considered above]? I don't really see any way to construe this phrase other than "an expert as chosen by the ICGA", and don't see why post-tournament this should change to be qualified as "independent expert advice" (and I as say, adding the word "independent" would probably just transfer the squabbles to be over what it means, either in a quasi-judicial or procedural sense). Incidentally, I ran across a laughable "expert witness" dispute (about linear combinations) yesterday, see page 6 and 7 (Section C) of this.

(The report did contain subjective views on Rybka 3 and I'm afraid even an analysis of Rajlich's character, but those views should have been left out and should have been ignored by the ICGA Executive Board. Expert advice should not take the form of "I have reasons not to trust that guy, so he is guilty".)

I think you are somewhat back-fitting the EC term (borrowed from rule 2) of "expert advice" to the Panel report/procedure, and in a rather en masse manner. But a different interpretation could be that parts of the Report were indeed "expert advice", and others were, well, assorted fluff (at best). I have no knowledge of what was considered or ignored by the ICGA executive.

Of course the panel could not help that the ICGA Executive Board even went beyond the facts established by the panel. The panel did not establish any facts regarding Rybka 3, for example.

I think in a Panel discussion it was discussed whether the 2008-10 entries could adequately be modelled by Rybka 3 and 4, and the (only?) opinion on the matter was that this was not yet warranted. And as in the previous comment, I think that taking the Report as presenting "facts established by the panel" (as an expert witness) is a bit too much of trying to shoehorn it into some more typical procedural framework. [To put it more crudely: You probably can't try to retroactively make sense of the ICGA procedure as seen by the EC vis-a-vis Rule #2, unless you accept a few misgivings and work by rather loose analogy at some points].

Anyway, I might as well (for better or worse) quote what Levy said about later Rybka entries: The ICGA has not done extensive analysis of newer versions of Rybka. It was sufficient for the ICGA to determine that Rajlich had broken Tournament Rule 2, which we did. When the ICGA chose to ban Rybka for life due to violating the rules in ICGA events in 2006 and 2007, this required all of Rajlich's programs be removed, since the newer programs would never have been allowed to compete if the violation of earlier versions was discovered sooner and the lifetime ban issued earlier. So while it is possible that newer versions of Rybka also contained Fruit-derived code, it was not essential to prove this once we had proved the case for the 2006 and 2007 ICGA tournaments. Note that the language he uses could be taken to make the 2008-10 removals conditional on the lifetime ban having been retroactively assessed starting in 2007. [Fortunately, FIDE could led them off the hook again, by allowing a 3-year ban under then-applicable CoE sanctions, conveniently lasting through his final appearance in 2010].

The panel recommendation should not have included any suggestion on the sanction or penalty to be imposed, at least not if the panel is supposed to exist for the purpose of giving expert advice on technical issues. I accept there is also an element of "programmer's ethics", so I guess it is OK to give a view on the severity of the rule infraction, but such views should not suggest any sanctions. (And of course Rule 2 is pretty clear anyway on what the possible sanction could be.)

Although I would agree that the Panel acting qua "expert advisor on technical matters" could be circumspected in this scope, again I refer to the previous paragraphs (concerning what the Panel is/was/ought-to-be/perhaps-could-be-considered-as), and also note that the Charter states that recommendations of actions are part of the Panel's purpose:

The purpose of the Panel shall be to:
  (c) Make recommendations to the ICGA as to what action if any should be taken against those found by the
     Panel to have been guilty of cloning or creating a derivative;

That refusal [to join the panel] was then used against him, which in my view is completely unjustified.

I don't remember specifically this refusal being used against him? I don't think the EC complaint specifies anything about this. I could find 3 possible "uses" of his refusal against him.

• In the Panel report section "Opinion of panel members": Dailey and Uniacke show rather severe annoyance (at the ethical level) about his refusal to address the allegations, as does Skinner to a lesser degree. [The refusal is also mentioned in the procedural history (1.3) of the report].
• Levy email of May 13: Up to now you have not responded positively to my invitations to respond to the various allegations that have been made against you during the course of this investigation.
• in the verdict: During the course of the investigation and upon presentation of the Secretariat’s report Vasik Rajlich did not offer, despite repeated invitations from the ICGA to do so, any kind of defence to the allegations, or to the evidence, or to the Secretariat’s report...

Only the first seems to me to be of notable content as possibly "being used against him" to any degree, though the other two do take a certain tone toward the matter. If you could show a demonstrative link between the Panel comments (regarding refusal) and anything that later ensued, I would say your view might be more justified. But I would think it more to be a "minor influence" at best.

When was Rajlich asked to prove his innocence for all his entries? When did he refuse to do so?

[I suspect the context is the word all here --- also, the prior postings had some contextual confusion with "issues being raised" (to the EC?), versus the specific issue of the 2008-10 entries not being examined]. Of course it won't meet the strictest juridical protocols, but the May 13 email could be taken to meet the first request in that it subjoins and articulates the Panel Report (asking him to respond it), particularly "pleas for mitigation", presumably against the report Recommendation of stripping him of "all ICGA Tournament titles" -- the subsequent lack of responses could then suffice for the latter. [It probably depends on how the judge feels toward the disputants as to how far this can be stretched]. As noted above, Levy's comments could be taken to imply that the "lifetime ban" started in 2007 and so already wiped out 2008-10 (of course, just because Levy might imply something in an interview, that doesn't mean it is the official ICGA position -- in particular, the verdict proposed an alternative schema, namely that Rajlich had indeed broken Rule #2 in all 5 WCCC appearances).

And how could he have done it [showing cause for his 2008-10 entries], except by opening up his code to his worst enemies?

I didn't know that Ken Thompson was one of his worst enemies. [And since KT was suggested by the ICGA, he obviously would not be "independent" to a sufficient degree!]. I remember back in 2008 (if you recall, there was some talk of a complaint about Rybka being filed at the WCCC that year), that Harvey Williamson was quite clear that he as the Hiarcs operator would not have access to the source code if a complaint was made against him, and that there were comments in this regard that the commercial guys would probably have to just lump it and endure disqualification if a complaint (deemed acceptable to the ICGA) was made. It's obviously a trade-off that must be given some weight, particularly when the possibility of complaints is more than just hypothetical. [Somehow using the phrase "occupational hazard" doesn't sound right, but might be an analogy].

In the end he was given one month to reply during a time in which he was very busy. After so many years, would it have been too much to delay by a few more months?

I would agree with Levy that Rajlich is not the one who chooses the dates of hearings, but also agree with you that some delay (maybe one month, given specific grounds for it) would be acceptable in the situation. Certainly all the forums were wondering at the time what was taking so long (indeed, about 2 months after the Panel convened there was some Rybka Forum comments about Rajlich having the right to receive a report from the ICGA in due time, and not have them drag this out forever, and with Vas's name having been smeared by the accusations thus time was of the essence, blahblah), but the ICGA presumably shouldn't let itself be moved by that. I don't think being "very busy" (the phrase was schedule is very full for the next 7 months) matters much, eg the EC only gives you 21 days (though Short did request and receive an extension back in 2007, as he was travelling a lot). And sometimes you have to make some [hopefully minor] re-arrangements in your life to address matters like this (also he should consider it taking away from his "free time", not "work time" as I infer from "schedule"). If his wife had just given birth, or he was finalising a cluster-cloud contract with ChessBase, etc., sure give him some time, but 7 months for a "very full" schedule?!

Another argument would be that he had known the essence of these allegations for some time, and it's not clear exactly what giving extra time would really gain for him (other than as a delaying tactic), certainly without himself specifying anything in particular. How long should it take to construct a defense to the main claims (ignore Rybka/Crafty for now)?

• Nearly the entire evaluation function (of Rybka) is derived from Fruit
• In summary, the evaluation functions are nearly identical
• Rybka 1.0 Beta and Fruit 2.1 have exactly the same evaluation features (preliminary finding)
• Comparison of evaluation features shows high similarity of Rybka (including 2.3.2a) and Fruit

Rajlich could presumably dispute either: (1) the contention that Rybka and Fruit have similar evaluations is erroneous (possibly because the studied Rybka versions are irrelevant to this discussion), (2) they are similar, but it is not out of the ordinary, (3) they have extraordinary similarities but this is not prohibited by the rules. His correspondence with Levy suggests that he would argue #2 (via ponderhit data, which Levy noted was only marginally operative) and #3 (I'd say that Rybka is in compliance with these rules, although some of the terms are kind of vague and The vague phrase "derived from game-playing code written by others" also does not in my view apply to Rybka). I would guess giving Rajlich an extra month to determine how best to convince the ICGA that its "vague" rules should not be applied to him would have largely been wasted. [Although I agree that Rule #2 is not the clearest in the world, Levy in his ICGA Journal comment pointed out that Rajlich was personally present in Turin 2006 and saw/heard the debate over the LION++ disqualification, and so at the very least should have known he was treading on thin ice, and perhaps asked for a clarification].

(Why does the "recommendation" make a point of the entry forms not mentioning that earlier versions, that everybody agrees never competed in ICGA tournaments and had little if anything in common with the "real" Rybka, included code from Crafty? A program that was in fact recommended by Hyatt to use as a starting point that one could eventually evolve into something that is "yours".)

Maybe by now "everybody agrees" that early Rybka has "little if anything in common" with the competition versions, but in 2011 it was a different story, and Rajlich had made statements which could be taken to imply the contrary. See the previous page in the report (Rajlich has not disputed this email to ZW, as far as I know): Rybka started as a bitboard/MTD(f)/UCI engine back in March 2003. Everything I did after that, until today, has been incremental - although there were some pretty sharp turns. I can't imagine ever ditching my code base. Similarly one could be misled by his 2005 forum posting: The Rybka source code is original and pre-dates all of the Fruit releases (this was not quoted in the report). Perhaps any point that was being made in the Recommendation (as a parenthetical remark) should be taken as a contingency, in case Rajlich tried to elaborate on such putative Rybka provenance.

He was invited to a panel in lynch mode

Well, I guess our conversation here is deteroriating. Even the complaint only terms it a panel pre-conceived of his guilt. On a different topic, I might say that 2. a4 is looking reasonable (I am tired of sluggish progress [if any at all] with Ba6, and so am looking elsewhere), but still very very preliminary.

[BB+]

It was clear that the ICGA had no intention of handling things in a fair manner. They made loud and unnecessary public accusations ...

[In the EC Complaint] There is no citation of such "loud and unnecessary public accusations" (by the ICGA)

Going over the EC Complaint with a finer tooth comb, it seems that footnote 10 (which is not referenced in the text, similarly with all of #9-13) cites the Levy column in ChessVibes. Reading this, I find it (very) hard to think anything Levy says should be termed an "accusation" (admittedly, Rajlich might have been using the word loosely in a forum post, but when integrating it into the Complaint he should use more care).

After some background on "The Rybka-Fruit Case", Levy states: At this point in time I do not intend to make any definitive statement of my own on these allegations, but will allow the reader to form their own opinion after reading the following. He then gives ZW's evidence in brief, continues by quoting Rajlich on Osipov's 2007 Fruit contentions, then eats up a bunch of space with VR's 2008 comments on Strelka, and concludes by putting forth Rajlich's recent correspondence regarding ZW's 2009-11 claims.

[syzygy]

The following phrase could be taken to indicate that the EC felt that Rajlich was sufficiently informed of the possibility of disqualification: One person who is informed that his behaviour could be qualified as a cheating and sanctioned with a lifetime ban is likely to assume different decisions about his defence, in comparison to a person who just know about the risk to be disqualified from a tournament. I wouldn't think they would just be making an abstract comparison, but they indeed might (a few lines previous it talks of the "very informal way" that Rajlich was informed for instance).

"It's a possible interpretation", but the preceding sentence reads:

He was informed, and in a very informal way, only about the proceedings concerning “Tournament rule 2” and it is clear –from the exchange of messages between him and Mr Levy- that he was not fully acquainted with the possible multifaceted nature of the proceedings and his right to be heard.

This does not seem to say that the situation was without deficiencies as far as rule 2 was concerned: "in a very informal way", "not fully acquainted with ... his right to be heard".

I'm not sure what other elements of a right to be heard are at issue? Unless you are putting impartiality under this heading?

The right to be heard requires that a decision against a party is only taken after it has been given a real opportunity to comment on the relevant facts and grounds. The ICGA gave Vas one month to comment on the panel report, but under the circumstances that may not have been sufficient. He had already made it clear that he had a busy schedule until the beginning of October.

Suppose he had been properly informed of the possibility of a life-ban. Would that one month then have been sufficient? Of course in practice knowing that the sanction might be severe might have been reason for him to free up some time, possibly turning that one month into an effective opportunity, but that reasoning would lead to the surprising conclusion that the heavier the (properly communicated) maximum sanction, the shorter the minimum acceptable period for reply.

Another reason why the right to be heard arguably was not respected is that the panel report already contained the guilty verdict. Clearly there was no way anymore for the panel to change its mind when Rajlich was given the opportunity to comment. It does not seem very reasonable to expect that the ICGA Executive Committee did not feel bound by the report. The counter-argument is that Rajlich was invited to join the panel, but that was presented as optional (even though his choice not to join it was rather clearly held against him later). (Btw, in my view it would have been unreasonable to demand of Rajlich that he joined that panel. You can't expect someone to put his daily life on hold to take on what are mostly his opponents in an unstructured closed internet fight.)

"For any decision concerning a violation of their tournament rules, ICGA has not to respect a given model of procedural rules (...)." "Exactly as a chief arbiter or a TD (...)." "an Investigation panel (that has not to be necessarily independent)."

Contrariwise, while the EC stresses that the ICGA didn't have to follow any particular procedure, at the same time I don't think it passes any specific judgement on the procedure the ICGA chose, in particular whether it sufficed for a right to be heard and/or for (subsidiary) impartiality.

Lots of evidence was presented in support of an allegation of partiality. The EC could certainly not have ruled that the panel was impartial without first debunking that evidence. And let's face it, it's a bit of a stretch to say that there were no partiality issues with certain panel/secretariat members.

But I agree, formally they did not pass a judgment on this issue. The EC considered that it fell under the application of a tournament rule, with which they could not interfere. (Btw, this seems to be known as the "field of play" doctrine, and I still do not agree that the application of rule 2 by the ICGA post-tournament, as opposed to in-tournament by the TD, falls within it.)

What the EC will do in an extreme case is difficult to predict, but if this judgment is anything to go by, they will accept it.

It could be my personal bias, but I think the presentations in this case tended to diminish Rajlich's prospects (already the complaint is rather fitful, without even seeing Levy's response).

Well, the authors were not jurists and they were convinced to act in the best interest of Rajlich. What cannot be denied is that they found a way to get a legal opinion with a certain binding value on two points of the whole matter, and on one point they clearly "won". That certainly beats the thousands and thousands of repetitive forum posts filled with insults that have been wasted on this issue. I would probably not have thought of appealing to the EC and even if I had, I would probably not have given it a serious chance. So I'll be the last one to criticise the complaint.

Given the legal reasoning of the EC, I can't easily see how the outcome could have been more positive for Rajlich by a different, more complete or more to the point presentation. I cannot exclude that the EC could have somehow been persuaded that it should review the post-tournament application of "tournament rule 2" in a more detailed way, or that the conventional understanding of that rule was that it did not apply post-tournament, but I see no good reason to believe this would have been possible. Challenging the impartiallity of the ICGA Executive Board would have been an option, but I don't know if there is any suitable evidence for that (for example evidence of statements by Levy suggesting that he had made up his mind on Rajlich's guilt at some point in time prior to the expiry of Rajlich's time period for commenting on the panel report).

I might respond to your other points in a separate post.

[syzygy]

Going over the EC Complaint with a finer tooth comb, it seems that footnote 10 (which is not referenced in the text, similarly with all of #9-13) cites the Levy column in ChessVibes. Reading this, I find it (very) hard to think anything Levy says should be termed an "accusation" (admittedly, Rajlich might have been using the word loosely in a forum post, but when integrating it into the Complaint he should use more care).

Thanks, I was looking for that column. The link on the chess programming wiki no longer works (and when I tried accessing the column some days ago the Internet Archive was temporarily down; it's back up now and still has the article at the old URL).

Anyway:

Genuinely achieving a great result in a top level chess tournament requires years of painstaking effort by a highly skilled and highly motivated programmer or team of programmers, yet the creation of a clone steals the glory and public acclaim from its rightful owner. The ICGA would like to see this disgusting practice stopped and those who perpetrate the cloning publicly exposed for what they are. This article is the ICGA’s opening shot in that struggle.

So Levy refers to a "disgusting practice" that must be "stopped" and of perpetrators that must be "publicly exposed". Those are strong words. He wrote this just a few days before the case against Rajlich was launched and we know of no other case that he might have had in mind.

But it goes on:

The Rybka-Fruit Case
In cases such as the antics of Langer and Espin very little proof is needed to establish the cloning. But in some cases there is a more sophisticated cloning effort, when the clone programmer(s) attempt to hide their actions by making changes to the code of “their” program, presumably hoping to obscure the original source of the algorithms, ideas and the original code itself.

So he even does not attempt to hide what this is about. The whole article is a case against Rybka / Rajlich.

But as I have mentioned, at first the Rybka-Fruit case was mere rumour. More recently, however, these rumours have become firm allegations, made by expert chess programmers and supported by evidence which appears on the surface to be rather compelling, both in its nature and in its volume. At this point in time I do not intend to make any definitive statement of my own on these allegations, but will allow the reader to form their own opinion after reading the following.

He does "not intend to make any definitive statement", but he certainly does not mind it if the kind reader adds up 1 and 1 to get 2.

In my view this column definitely disqualifies Levy as an impartial "judge". He knew the case would end up on his desk, so he should have refrained from publicly commenting on its merits, and he should certainly not have insinuated guilt. Or he should have recused himself.

After some background on "The Rybka-Fruit Case", Levy states: At this point in time I do not intend to make any definitive statement of my own on these allegations, but will allow the reader to form their own opinion after reading the following. He then gives ZW's evidence in brief, continues by quoting Rajlich on Osipov's 2007 Fruit contentions, then eats up a bunch of space with VR's 2008 comments on Strelka, and concludes by putting forth Rajlich's recent correspondence regarding ZW's 2009-11 claims.

Was it wise of Levy to write that column?

[BB+]

Challenging the impartiallity of the ICGA Executive Board would have been an option, but I don't know if there is any suitable evidence for that ...

I was going to note in my previous addendum that the EC is careful to state merely: there is no evidence that the members of the ICGA Executive Committee ... did not act in an impartial way", rather than a more definitive "the ICGA acted impartially." But as far as I know, there is no such evidence [EDIT: it seems that we have disagreement regarding the Attack of the Clones article here], despite Rajlich's assertion it was "clear from the beginning" that the ICGA was not going to be fair.

Clearly there was no way anymore for the panel to change its mind when Rajlich was given the opportunity to comment.

This was actually something that was discussed -- what happens after the Panel finishes its job? [I think I specifically asked this privately to Secretariat at one point, and MarkL did not know IIRC]. I think the general opinion was that "we're done!" after the Report was concluded, and the prospective lack of future comment played a role in the tone and harshness, particularly of the opinions.

On the other hand, the EC Complaint (Section 3) proposes that Levy should have referred the "ponderhit" data to the Panel (but instead he "withheld" this), which implies that it would still be seen as operational. [Hmm, the Complaint underwhelms me again: the Charter clearly states the Panel is in charge to weigh and judge all evidence -- err, no it doesn't say that at all (let alone "clearly"), particularly in the four purposes listed? -- and the section concludes by reiterating the unsubstantiated claim: However, the ICGA simply did not take his responses seriously, having already made public accusations].

In particular, under the purported Panel procedures that Rajlich's complaint implies, if he had submitted other defenses, these too would have been expected to have been presented to the Panel for analysis and comment. It is probably not the main point here, but if there is such back-and-forth, with multiple discussions and Panel votes and re-comment by Rajlich, can one expect "the final hearings [to be] in October or November" if his initial response is much delayed?

It does not seem very reasonable to expect that the ICGA Executive Committee did not feel bound by the report.

It might be that not reasonable to you (or even to me to some degree), but it seems that the ICGA both argued this (see Levy's ChessBase interview for instance), and the EC accepted the point (contrary to the "top-down" model proposed in the Complaint regarding the Panel where impartiality was clearly a paramount requirement within the powerful Secretariat who all but formally rendered the final verdict). And again I think the ICGA executive would feel less bound by the Report in the presence of a effective defense (though I agree that Rajlich might have perceived the situation differently [and wrongly IMO], that the deal was done and all he could do was plead for mercy).

Given the legal reasoning of the EC, I can't easily see how the outcome could have been more positive for Rajlich by a different, more complete or more to the point presentation.

I think a "less scurrilous" and "more direct" presentation would be the features I would most admire. This could, at the very least, have improved the "warning" to a "reprimand" if the facts were on base (whether such is "more positive for Rajlich" is a different matter -- it would certainly be "more positive" for those who hector and harangue ICGA/Levy/Hyatt). And given the factual matter of the case, namely that the ICGA lacks any statutory basis to sanction (ergo FIDE is seen in an unjustifiable unfavourable light), it's hard to see how the outcome could be more positive for the ICGA. So by some cake-cutting theorem, everyone is happy!!

[BB+]

the commercial guys would probably have to just lump it and endure disqualification if a complaint

Related to this point, see also page 4-5 of A Lost Opportunity, regarding that there be open (requestable) access to the opponent's executables [and game logs] in the attempted Rybka-Junior 2007 match. Mig Greengard, with his typical wit, presented this news as: I know you and I know you don't have anything better to do this weekend than read an eight-page article that gives the blow-by-blow behind the scenes action of a computer match that isn't going to happen. Coincidentally, just the other day IM David Levy sent me just such a document!. Abramov later gave a reply, wherein Mig's comments:

... I don't agree with his statement that chess players all over the world care about high-level computer matches. Unless they are playing against a top human, that is. It's hard to measure something like interest in a sub-sub-section of a sport as marginal as chess already is. But based on the comments and traffic I've seen over the years, there is a small, vociferous band of computer chess junkies who are passionately interested in comp-comp chess. Trying to make the leap from that to the general public may actually be easier than trying to convince the rest of the chess-playing world to care. But they'll need robots making the moves and perhaps an animated movie or two.

Regarding the last sentence, the Man-Machine Shogi matches both this year and last had robots making the computer moves.